The Bolivarian Militia of Venezuela turned 11 this week. It is the flagship of the civil-military alliance devised by Hugo Chávez, which has become even more important under the regime of Nicolás Maduro, who is trying to retain power despite the political, humanitarian and now health crisis that is plaguing Venezuela. The uniformed officers have become their main support, a network woven from million-dollar profits, according to a recent investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP, for its acronym in English).

The Venezuelan military disappeared from the public life of the country after the fall of the military regime in 1958. That changed when a young lieutenant colonel named Hugo Chávez won the polls in 1998 after an attempt to take the Miraflores Palace by force. Four years later, he was overthrown for a few hours by a military rebellion. Then the civil-military union was born.

“After the failed military coup of 2002, Chávez increases the role of reliable officials in managing the economy”, such that high-ranking military officers gradually take control of five ports and of the state oil company, PDVSA", the jewel in the Venezuelan crown, recalls OCCRP. The new Constitution, of 1999, consecrates the Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (FANB) as a vector of development and defense of the country.

Maduro, who sits on the throne of Miraflores after Chávez's death in 2013, “has further expanded the role of the military in civilian life”. “By 2018, active or retired officials held seven of the 23 state governorships and nine ministries and ran at least 60 state-owned companies.” These soldiers constitute “the essence of 'madurismo'” and “are more important today than at any other time under Chávez”, says Javier Corrales , a professor at Amherst College of Massachusetts, to OCCRP.

Harry Solano, a sergeant from the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) who deserted and is now in Colombia, clarifies that “there is nothing of ideology” in loyalty from the military leadership to Maduro. “Everything is business,” he says. “If the regime falls, they stop receiving money”, he stresses. Another lieutenant based in the neighboring country who prefers to remain anonymous subscribes to these words: "Loyalty to the Maduro regime is to make a profit, that's why they will not betray him."

The 35 Club

The OCCRP has carried out an investigation, based on a series of internal FANB documents, records of land, companies and public contracts and interviews with various sources, including the military, which exposes “the intimate financial relationship between the Maduro Administration and a cabal of generals linked to private companies” whose lucrative returns would guarantee their loyalty to the president, despite the “deteriorating political and economic situation” in the country .

“There are three types of military-businessmen in Venezuela,” says Corrales, who distinguishes between those who run public companies, those who have private businesses that they contract with the State and those involved in illegal businesses. “None of these groups likes a transition to a non-'Chavista' regime,” he adds.

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According to 2019 data, the Venezuelan Army -the most powerful branch of the FANB- has 312 active generals, 84 of whom work for public or private companies listed in the Registry of Contracts Public, despite the fact that Venezuelan law expressly prohibits public representatives from doing business with the Government through their own companies.

Of these 84 generals, 35 sit on the boards of private companies. They have created 41 private companies that since 2004 have won some 220 public contracts in sectors such as food, tourism and oil, obtaining substantial profits. This is what the OCCRP has called the Club of 35.

“It has become a kind of military doctrine for many officers to create their own company,” says Pedro Mendoza, a former GNB lieutenant who deserted and lives in Colombia. The tacit pact between the government and these generals is " you protect me, you keep me in power, and in exchange I give you the possibility of having economic benefits ", he says.

The incentive of money is even more powerful when the Venezuelan economy “has experienced the worst collapse in half a century that any country that has not suffered a war or a natural disaster has had”, according to with the International Monetary Fund. The population living in extreme poverty went from 10 to 85 percent in just four years, between 2014 and 2018.

Official figures obtained by the OCCPR indicate that a general earns the equivalent of about 8.9 dollars a month, taking into account the official exchange rate and hyperinflation. “The salary is not enough, that's why the officers have their parallel businesses,” Mendoza says.

Godfather, on top

OCCRP has not been able to accurately quantify the total benefits that the Club of 35 has obtained with its business network, although it stresses that its lifestyle is incompatible with that monthly income. An example of this is the Minister of Defense, Vladimir Padrino, who officially earns less than eight dollars a month and, nevertheless, wears watches of around 12,000 dollars< /b>.

Padrino began his rise through the military ranks with Chávez. In the 2002 coup, he sided with the president and the latter rewarded him by naming him commander of Fort Tiuna, the headquarters of the FANB and the Ministry of Defense. Since then he continued to climb until in 2012 he was appointed chief of the General Staff. Two years later, already with Maduro, he became Minister of Defense.

Padrino's meteoric career in military and political ranks is consistent with that of his businesses. Since 2009, 19 companies have been registered in the United States in the names of relatives of Padrino, who also have ties to at least five companies in Venezuela. Five of the companies located in the North American powerhouse generate annual profits of around 700,000 dollars. Three located in Miami bought a dozen properties valued at about 2.2 million dollars.

Two entities stand out from the Padrino family emporium. One is Trámites Consulares, registered in 2010 in Texas and located in Florida, which is dedicated to facilitating bureaucratic procedures for Venezuelans abroad, such as obtaining a Venezuelan passport or political asylum in the United States.

The second is Prinmaplast, based in Venezuela in the name of Padrino's wife, whose business is painting. In his case, the key is that he has access to a privileged exchange rate. “The large difference between the official and unofficial exchange rate means that a company that legally accesses a million dollars that year could turn it into ten million by selling the dollars on the black market and using the bolívares to buy more dollars at the official change. The profit margin would be about nine million dollars, minus what was spent on imports, if it spends anything”, illustrates the OCCPR. Prinmaplast received almost four million dollars between 2004 and 2012, he adds.

For Ramón Castellanos, a retired lieutenant colonel from the same class as Padrino, the apparent contradiction between the Bolivarian doctrine he proclaims and the financial reality he enjoys is not a surprise: “I never saw him as a communist, as someone willing to share his wealth. He likes to live well, he loves America and he likes to drink whiskey.

Some members of the club

One of them, according to the OCCRP, is General Hernán Akhnanton Noguera Mejía, who has the largest number of state contracts with 47. Through his catering company, organized a barbecue for 600 Seniat officials, the national customs and tax service. The company was founded in 2010, just a month after he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Another member of the “club” is General Jesús Emilio Vásquez Quintero, current attorney general of the Military Attorney General's Office, an institution linked to internal judicial prosecution in the Armed Forces and that, even, as Various NGOs denounced him, he initiated trials against civilians. In 2005 the El Tepuy Cooperative Association was founded, in which he, along with his wife, Tibisay Villalobos, appear with 40% of the shares.

Some of the 35 Club members included family members in their companies to keep their dealings secret. OCCRP found at least five generals with relatives in key positions in their companies. For example, General Alejandro Ramón Maya Silva, director of the Army Commander General's office, is linked to two companies: Aquila Grupo Empresarial, C.A. and La Granja Integral, C.A. Two of his sons are on the board of directors.

(With information from Europa Press)

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