Now that Di Stéfano has passed away, I find myself again with the recurring accusation by Barcelona that he came to Madrid in an operation to dispossess Barça, which would fit with an alleged wish of Franco (or Francoism ) to make the team from the country's capital the great team of Spain. At the expense of Barça.

Not true. There is a snowball that began to roll in Barcelona on November 30, 1980, based on an article by Lluís Permanyer, son of a vice president of Barcelona when the events occurred, which in my opinion presented a distorted version of the matter.

A tangled affair, conducive to half truths.

Fantasies have been added to that outburst, based on the original idea, which have gradually enriched a legend that is easy to believe. The international press has helped spread it abroad. It fits with the idea of ​​a combative Franco against the independence aspirations of Catalonia.

But it wasn't. Di Stéfano did not play for Madrid because Franco (or Francoism) got into his head. I know that it is difficult to "disconvince" the convinced, but it seems fair to try.

It went like this:

Di Stéfano had escaped from River Plate in Buenos Aires in August 1949 to play for Millonarios in Bogotá. So far all versions agree. Something like a "pirate league" had been organized there, which hired players from various origins (many Argentines, but not only from there) without paying a transfer for them.

FIFA reacted by expelling Colombia from its organization. And the prohibition was decreed, for the rest of the world, of arranging friendly matches with the teams of the Colombian 'pirate league'.

The situation was undesirable neither for FIFA (club soccer around the world was threatened by a country that did not pay transfer fees) nor for the Colombian clubs themselves, which could not collect income from exhibitions in friendlies, a formula that then (without television or international tournaments) it gave a lot of money.

So in 1951 an agreement was reached, the so-called 'Pact of Lima', at the corresponding FIFA congress. Through him, an agreement was reached that the 'escaped' players would remain the property of the corresponding Colombian club until the end of their contract, the date on which their property would return to their club of origin.

The corresponding Colombian club could not transfer any player involved in the case, since it was not their property beyond the time the contract expired. And the club that we could call 'of origin' could not dispose of the player until his contract with the Colombian club in question expired.

With that resolved, Colombian clubs could now play friendlies abroad. That allowed the Millionaires to tour Europe, which included their presence in the main acts of the Fiftieth Anniversary of Real Madrid. A triangular between Madrid, Norrköping and Millonarios. The Millionaires won it and Di Stéfano dazzled.

That happened in March 1952.

Bernabéu was fascinated by the player, he was interested in his signing and Alfonso Senior, president of Millonarios, told him that he could not sell it to him, due to the conditions of the Lima pact. José Samitier, then Barça's technical secretary and an extraordinary man in everything (insight, sympathy, relationships...), also fell in love with the player.

That same summer of 1952 Real Madrid traveled to Caracas, to the so-called Little World Cup. Madrid and Millonarios played two more games there, which, by the way, came out with sticks. And there was still one more game, in Bogotá, between both teams. While the players hit each other on the field, the managers strengthened relationships in the box.

At the end of that year, 1952, and after some friendlies in Chile, Di Stéfano decided to leave Millonarios and stay in Buenos Aires. He is already 26 years old, he has two daughters, he is terrified of the plane (something that has always accompanied him) and his father has bought a large ranch in which he must lend a hand. He is married, with his girlfriend from the neighborhood (with whom he will spend his entire life, until her death), and has two daughters. He is fed up with the rhythm of friendlies with which the Millionaires are financing themselves.

Before staying in Buenos Aires, he collects $4,000 in advance, as an advance payment for the contract that bound him to the Millonarios until the end of 1954. He justifies himself in the idea that the Millonarios had him without paying transfer and that, in the long run, has complicated his life. In the Millionaires, in addition, he has given a sensational performance. He feels entitled to that money.

So at the beginning of 1953, Di Stéfano was in Buenos Aires, determined to give up soccer. In principle, he has no desire to return to River Plate, where he had already had problems before escaping to Colombia, because he had been one of the distinguished players in the soccer players' strike that, in the long run, led to that massive escape to Colombia. .

Under these conditions, he is visited by representatives from Barça. Domingo Waltz Taberner and Riera. Barça had found that Kubala had a serious lung condition that raised fears for his career. Martí Carreto, president of the club, entrusted José Samitier with the search for a star who could compensate for such an absence.

Samitier immediately thought of Di Stéfano.

Di Stéfano received the envoys from Barça, and after some conversations, encouraged by his father and after knowing that in Spain he would generally travel by train (sleeping car), he decided to accept.

Barça paid River Plate four million pesetas in round numbers. And Di Stéfano came to Spain to play for Barça. On May 22, 1953, Samitier received him at Barajas. Di Stéfano came with his family. They traveled by road, spent the night in Zaragoza and arrived in Barcelona the following day.

But meanwhile, two things had happened.

One: Kubala had been cured. Barça had once again been League champion. And soon it would also be Cup.

Another: the Millionaires (Alfonso Senior), aware of the operation, had denounced it to FIFA. Senior, who was a high-flying man in international football, was also right. Di Stéfano belonged to Millonarios until the end of 1954, only after January 1955 did it become the property of River again. The rights that Barça had bought could not come into force until then.

Barça is caught off guard by the issue, because the Kubala case is still litigating before FIFA. Actually, it is being litigated by the Spanish Federation on his behalf. To those who have an interest in this matter and want to know the truth, I refer you to the corresponding chapter of my book 'Born to bother'.

(In summary, we could summarize it as Kubala, who fled from Hungary, was welcomed in Spain for his value as anti-communist propaganda. He tried to sign him at the Bernabéu, but the Federation, whose secretary and crucial figure at the time was Ricardo Cabot, an important figure from Barcelona , diverted it to Barça. First he was camouflaged as an 'amateur', he even played as a professional. Until the dates of the 1954 World Cup, at the corresponding FIFA congress, Barça did not have an international transfer. By then he had been playing for two long years at Barça as a professional, a time in which Barça had won the Cup (52), the League and the Cup (53), the League and the Cup (54) consecutively.This is perhaps the moment to say that if any player left the arm of the Regime was by Kubala, which was also directly used as anti-communist propaganda in a film entitled 'The Aces seek peace').

I insist, whoever wants more details can read the aforementioned chapter.

Di Stéfano arrived in Barcelona. In those first days he is seen together with Kubala witnessing a match for España Industrial (later called Condal), at the time a subsidiary of Barça.

And also from those days are the photos of Di Stéfano dressed for Barça, one of them, widely spread, squatting next to Kubala. In another, they pretend to play against each other. In another, he controls a ball. They correspond to a report published in 'Vida Deportiva', a magazine of the time. They are made in Las Corts, the Barça field at the time. The stands are empty. They do not belong to any party.

But for Barça, the matter soon became a problem, because FIFA, before which the dispute over Kubala was still pending, warned the Spanish Federation that Di Stéfano could not play for Barça.

And he did not play on those dates, although the opposite has been argued many times. He played some friendlies or tributes later, as he did in other clubs, as I will show later. At the time that was quite common practice.

It has often been argued, he said, that Di Stéfano played three games for Barça that summer. Is not true. Those parties do not exist. They don't appear anywhere. There are some ‘costellada’ parties that I will refer to later.

Anyone who is interested can review (it's easy now, on the internet) the collections of El Mundo Deportivo or La Vanguardia in those summer months of 1953. Or, if they prefer to take a short cut, they can consult the splendid book 'Barçaeterno' , by Toni Closas and David Salinas, which collects all the matches in the history of Barça in impressive detail.

A colossal job. There is a small version, the size of a cigarette pack, or not even that, on bible paper, extremely useful.

Anyone who wants to can check that Barça played three friendlies that summer, after the Cup final (which they beat Athletic Bilbao 2-1): one in Perpignan, another in Manresa and another in Badalona. Dates, June 25, 28 and 29, respectively. Di Stéfano played in none of them.

After that, Barça went to Caracas, to the 'Little World Cup', in which they will face the Caracas National Team, Corinthians and Roma. Twice each, because it was a league in two games (July 16, 18, 23, 26 and 28 and August 1). Even before returning, Barça plays on August 4 with Curaçao.

Di Stéfano did not go on that tour. Barça could not take him because Millonarios belonged, who had denounced the case.

When leaving for the tour, Martí Carreto declares that he will take advantage of the trip to solve the 'Di Stéfano case'. And, indeed, there he meets with Alfonso Senior, with whom he does not reach an agreement. Senior asks him for $27,000, the equivalent of 1,350,000 pesetas, a third of what Barça had paid River. Martí Carreto does not find it reasonable. He understands that the Millionaires want to get excessive money for a player that in reality they no longer have, who has escaped from them. And he tells him that he is willing if necessary to have him a year and a half without playing, until the term of ownership of the Millionaires expires. He declares it that way, something that Di Stéfano was not amused at all, as is to be understood.

Barça and Millionaires break up. It is then that Senior speaks with Madrid, with whom he has good relations. And at the request of Álvaro Bustamante, a very daring vice president who went further than Bernabéu, Madrid decides to buy the Millionaires, for those 27,000 dollars, the corresponding part of the rights. Raimundo Saporta travels to make the delivery.

Two reflections should be made here:

One: if Martí Carreto had paid the $27,000 to Millionaires, Di Stéfano would have automatically been a Barça player.

Two: Madrid could not exercise its right over Di Stéfano, because the Pact of Lima established that the Colombian clubs could not transfer the rights of the players involved in the case, only enjoy them while the contract was consummated.

Di Stéfano, therefore, was blocked, at least until January 1955.

And what did he do that summer of 1953? Get impatient, burn out. To move him, Samitier set up three games for him, those that are claimed to have played for Barça that summer, and that he did not play. One was with Palafrugell, against amateur Barcelona. Di Stéfano played with Palafrugell, not with Barcelona. There are the photos.

Another was a match in El Masnou (my mother's town, precisely), a match between 'holidayers' and 'residents'. Di Stéfano, César and Kubala were announced among the 'summer visitors'. At the moment of truth, Kubala didn't show up, I suppose so as not to sing too much. Di Stéfano was in Barcelona in a semi-clandestine state.

The other game was in Sitges. I have not found a photo of him.

The photo that appears below is usually used as proof that Di Stéfano came to play for Barcelona and was later 'stolen' by Franco's greed in favor of Madrid.

But this photo corresponds to a game played two years after the events, on June 12, 1955, against Vasco da Gama, when Di Stéfano had already played two full seasons in Madrid. He attended that game as a guest, in which Kubala was absent. Barça won 1-0, with a goal from Flotats.

Those who have doubts can go to the newspaper archives of El Mundo Deportivo or La Vanguardia, so easy to consult, and look at those days. Or to the aforementioned compilation by Toni Closa and David Salinas.

And it's enough to see that Di Stéfano is flanked by Villaverde and Luis Suárez, who were not at Barcelona in the summer of 1953. Luis Suárez arrived at the end of the 53-54, and Villaverde joined for the 54-55.

It had been, I insist, two years that Di Stéfano had been playing with Madrid, who had won those first two leagues with him, something he had not done since the Republic, when he had won the only two he had until the arrival of the genius.

It was not the first time that Di Stéfano played a friendly in Barcelona since his signing with Madrid. He had already played before, on January 26 of that 1955, a match between the Catalan National Team (which they played with some regularity during the Franco regime, although it sounds strange now) against Bologna.

That was the first time that Kubala and Di Stéfano played together, because Di Stéfano had not yet been nationalized and they had not been able to coincide in the Spanish National Team. The team was made up of players from Espanyol and Barça, with Di Stéfano as the icing on the cake. Kubala gave him the nine. The forward was Basora, Villaverde, Di Stéfano, Kubala and Moll. The 'Catalan Selection' won 6-3. Those who witnessed it remember it as a colossal game.

At this point, surely someone is seeing something strange in those two trips by Di Stéfano to Barcelona to play 'at home'. To understand that, you have to go back in time. In those times, with less busy calendars and greater doses of courtesy, it was common for great figures to lend themselves to reinforce other teams, in cases of tributes or international matches. It sounds weird today. Could Messi play a friendly with Madrid, or Casillas with Barça?

But then it was common. I will provide some cases:

In August 1959 he played a friendly against Newcastle with the Mallorca jersey, the city where he was spending the summer. It was on the occasion of the inauguration of the artificial light at the Lluís Sitjar.

Kubala himself played for Real Madrid, in a lead in which he coincided with Di Stéfano, in a tribute to Molowny. And Collar, Atlético's glorious left winger, was also in that lead.

How were Di Stéfano, Molowny himself and central defender Oliva dressed in Atlético at the tribute to Escudero.

And here we can see Di Stéfano at Depor, between Arsenio and Pahíño, in a tribute to Cuenca.

And later, Di Stéfano dressed again as a Barça, in the tribute to Kubala, held on August 30, 1961. In the photo that follows Kubala, Di Stéfano and Puskas appear. I don't know if with some intention, I often see the photo of the first two, without Puskas. It was a Barça-Stade de Reims, 4-3. Another great match. Lucien Müller played at that Stade de Reims, who later went through the two clubs, Madrid and Barça, successively.

But I return to the story. Di Stéfano lived in a flat on Balmes street that Barça made available to him. On the same street, Samitier had an office for a textile business that he ran with a partner. Di Stéfano's only distraction was to visit him. The monotony was only broken by those three little games that he put on. He noticed that in the Barça offices they shunned him.

Saporta visited him there. She received him with outrageous boxes:

-What do you want, block me?

Saporta assured him that no, that what they wanted was to hire him, to convince Barça to sell them River's contract. In proof of good will, he advanced money. Di Stéfano was beginning to be short of resources and was overwhelmed when he noticed that Barça was giving him a long time, that it had become a problem.

As the date approached, the Federation consulted FIFA, which in turn delegated arbitration to Muñoz Calero, former president of the Spanish Federation but a member of FIFA itself. Muñoz Calero was an Atlético man, not Madrid. He was vice president of Atlético. To his town, Águilas, he had taken Kubala to be baptized as a Catholic, so that he could obtain Spanish nationality.

It was Muñoz Calero who determined the Solomonic solution. First and third seasons (53-54 and 55-56), with Madrid. Second and fourth (54-55 and 56-57) with Barça. Then it would be seen. Not two and two, as they say, but one, one, one and one.

Meanwhile, the date of August 24 had come into force, on which the new prohibition of the National Sports Delegation to sign foreigners came into force. One more complication.

Barça is still making one last attempt with Alfonso Senior, who is in Madrid. The vice president, Narciso de Carreras, travels to Madrid to see him. He goes, and not Martí Carreto, due to his bad relationship with Senior. But there is no arrangement, Senior insists that he has sold his part to Madrid and that he had no interest in reopening the matter.

Martí Carreto then tries to sell his part to Juve, who does not accept, because he understands that what they offer him to buy is not a footballer but a problem, a player blocked for a year and a half. Later, he tries to resell the rights to River, which he also rejects. Both maneuvers, carried out without the knowledge and much less consent of Di Stéfano, irritate him, who is leaning more towards Madrid.

Finally, Barça agrees to Muñoz Calero's award and accepts the Solomonic pact, which both clubs sign. At the same time, they appealed to General Moscardó, National Sports Delegate, to extend the term for the registration of foreigners, in order to settle the matter, which had become almost a State problem.

Martí Carreto and Narciso de Carreras told me, separately, that they were pressured to accept the agreement. I think that's true. The Federation found itself on the wrong foot before FIFA, because the lawsuit between the two Spanish clubs was blocking a player, just at the time, and this is important, in which the Federation was insistently requesting FIFA to obtain from the Federation Hungarian Kubala transfer.

None of them spoke to me about personal threats, as I have come to read (“Remember that you have family”). Martí Carreto told me that they insinuated to him that he would not have the facilities from the Institute of Foreign Currency that he had been having for his business abroad. Narciso de Carreras told me that he felt spied on when he was at the Palace. It could be, but I imagine that by Madrid.

In any case, Martí Carreto's maneuver of wanting to get rid of Di Stéfano, sending him to Juve and returning the rights to River Plate, did not help him.

Moscardó traveled to the Pazo de Meirás, where the Council of Ministers was meeting, to consult his superior, the Minister Secretary General of the Movement, Fernández Cuesta. That trip is what makes many relate Franco directly to the matter. The name of General Moscardó is also very sweet, it must be admitted. But it is that he was the National Sports Delegate, and he traveled to obtain authorization to reverse a decree.

That authorization was not exactly for Di Stéfano to play for Madrid, but for him to play one year for Madrid, another for Barça, the third for Madrid and the fourth for Barça. It should be remembered.

On September 19, after the corresponding authorization, the National Sports Delegation admits the registration of foreign players who were in process before August 22. At this opening of the term, in addition to Di Stéfano, the Dutchman Faas Wilkes, for Valencia, the Chilean Andrés Prieto, for Espanyol, and the Frenchman Charles Ducasse, for Valladolid signed up.

Martí Carreto, unhappy with the solution, resigned. Barça appointed a manager, headed by Agustín Montal Sr., who would make the transition until the arrival of Miró Sans.

Di Stéfano's file was presented to the Federation on September 22. The following day he appeared in a friendly organized expressly, before Nancy. Madrid lost 2-4. He scored his first goal as a Real Madrid player on minute 67. From that match, this spectacular photo of a Chilean was left to remember. Black stockings. The white stockings will not appear until later, with the European Cup and its night games during the week.

Di Stéfano's Chilean in his debut against Nancy

On Sunday the 27th he makes his debut in the League, against Racing.

After matchday five, Madrid led Barça by two points. In the sixth, both teams should face each other in Chamartín, named after that, later on in the Santiago Bernabéu Stadium. Barça decided that week (“per vosaltres el pollastre”, “for you the chicken”) to sell its share of Di Stéfano to Madrid. The situation of having a player shared with the white club seemed irregular to him. Prior to the match between the two clubs, played on October 25, the document was signed by which Madrid paid Barça the four million, with interest, that Barça had paid to River Plate months before.

From that moment, Di Stéfano was fully from Madrid. The match was won by the whites 5-0.

Then came everything that came: the League title, the first since the Civil War, the next, the five European Cups... Madrid changed.

That was the thing, if you want to believe me. And if they have had the patience to get here.

In Barcelona it is told in a different way, which in my opinion is far from the truth. It would have been enough for Martí Carreto to pay Senior the amount he requested for Di Stéfano to have been from Barça.

If Franco had been so interested in making Madrid a great thing, he would have started earlier, I say. By the time all this happened, Madrid had not won a League since the two before the War, both, by the way, won during the Republic. After the war, what Madrid found was extraordinary competition in its own city, Atlético Aviación, a fusion of Atlético de Madrid and the 'Aviación' team, created during the war to play exhibition games behind the scenes, with players from truth or very apt soldiers. Atlético Aviación won the first two post-war leagues. The forties are the only long period in which Madrid was less than its city rival. And it was less than Barcelona, ​​Athletic and even Valencia.

The forties, the iron years of Francoism, were the worst years for Madrid.

With Di Stéfano everything changed. Starting in the 1960s, Madrid was installed and became, de facto, an instrument of the State. It was perceived as such. And at times he abused it. But that happened in the sixties, and as a consequence of what Di Stéfano provoked. Not before. And it was not a status brought about by the forces of the State, but by the tenacity of Bernabéu and the extraordinary ability of Di Stéfano.

For those who want some more precision, I add some annexes that detail some of the passages.

ANNEX 1

The pact of Lima

South American Congress. Lima, 1951

“The players of the Clubs of the Major Division, having previously belonged to Clubs of the National Associations of the following eight countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay and, having been transferred without have the corresponding transfer certificate from their Clubs of origin, they are authorized to continue playing with their respective and current Clubs in the Major Division until October 15, 1954 at the latest. Immediately afterwards these players are obliged to return to their Clubs of Origin”.

“The Colombian Football Association is not authorized to transfer even a single one of these players to another National Association, unless prior arrangement has been made in this regard with the National Association concerned”.

“The players of the Clubs of the Major Division, transferred without a transfer certificate issued by their Club of origin, and without having belonged to a Club of a National Association of the eight countries mentioned above, having been suspended from this made by their corresponding National Association, they are suspended and are not authorized to continue playing with their current Club of the Major Division, until an arrangement has been made, by which the competent National Association will expressly and formally lift the suspension promulgated previously." .

Likewise, players who illegally fled from their clubs, with a valid contract, should return to them at the end of the contracts signed with the Colombian teams and with the maximum term of December 31, 1954.

ANNEX 2

River Plate washes its hands

Statement from Enrique Pardo, president of River Plate. Buenos Aires, 1953.

On September 3, Enrique Pardo, president of River Plate, issued the following statement:

1.º When River Plate transferred Di Stéfano to the Barcelona Football Club, there was no resolution from the Spanish Federation that later prohibited the hiring of foreign players.

2.º In the Di Stéfano transfer agreement, he did not record that any arrangement with the player was at the risk and expense of C.F. Barcelona.

3rd By handing over Alfredo Di Stéfano's transfer to the Argentine Football Association to formalize his transfer to Barcelona, ​​River Plate was totally detached from the player and "from subsequent commitments".

4th If the Spanish Federation made a decision after the transfer, "River Plate has nothing to do".

ANNEX 3

Di Stéfano shares

Agreement reached by Santiago Bernabéu, president of Madrid, Enrique Martí, president of Barcelona, ​​and Muñoz Calero, member of FIFA.

Madrid, September 15, 1953

“AGREED.- First.- To fully accept the arbitration of Mr. Armando Muñoz Calero, as well as the following clauses dictated by him, with the warning that they are inspired by the best desire to resolve this matter, and that they previously require for its effectiveness the approval by the Hon. Mr. Conde del Alcázar de Toledo, National Sports Delegate, from the letter of Request addressed to him, and the consent of the Royal Spanish Football Federation:

a) The player Alfredo di Stéfano, once the regulatory requirement of his legal registration in the Royal Spanish Football Federation has been met, may be aligned in the representative team of Real Madrid F.C. in the 1953-54 and 1955-56 seasons, and for Barcelona C.F. in the 1954-55 and 1956-57 seasons, both in official competition matches and in friendlies or public or private training sessions that the respective Clubs deem appropriate to organize.

b) The Clubs Barcelona C.F. and Real Madrid C.F. They will respectively designate a delegate who with full authority will settle the expenses incurred by each one of the Clubs, accepting the charge of 50% of the total for each one of them.

c) At the end of the 1956-57 season, both Clubs, with the agreement of the player Alfredo di Stéfano, and if the legal provisions so allow, will decide on the subsequent performance of said player in Spain.

d) The aforementioned Clubs may by mutual agreement modify the previous clauses, in the sense of the definitive transfer of rights over the player, in favor of any of them, provided that this contractual modification is not opposed by the provisions in force. of the Higher Organisms.

e) Regardless of the resolution adopted by the National Sports Delegation in relation to the player Di Stéfano, both presidents undertake to make the maximum effort to consolidate the friendly sports relations that have always existed between their respective Clubs, in order to such outstanding roots in the football fans of Barcelona and Madrid”.

ANNEX 4

The resignation of Enrique Martí due to the Di Stéfano case

Barcelona, ​​September 22, 1953

“Accepting the kind invitation made to me by His Excellency the Civil Governor and aware of my duty, I believe in the obligation to give a public account of the cause of my resignation to the members and supporters of the Barcelona Football Club. Once the negotiations for the acquisition, in transfer, of the player Alfredo Di Stéfano, with River Plate, from Buenos Aires, began, we could not maintain official relations with the player because he was legally prohibited by the Royal Spanish Federation, until it was a fact the transfer.

Once we had the consent of River Plate, we got in touch with Club Millonarios, from Bogotá, and after long negotiations and vicissitudes, their delegate told us that the club that presented the River pass would also obtain the they. This did not happen, since later we learned that the president of Millonarios had ceded his rights to Real Madrid.

After making public the provision of the National Sports Delegation regarding foreign players, an order that we respectfully abide by, we did everything possible to transfer the player to a foreign club.

Since for this we needed the agreement of Real Madrid, I moved to said capital and under the auspices of a member of FIFA, who offered to do so, all steps were taken to carry out the transfer in full agreement with Real Madrid, without achieving it, in short. In this situation and only trying to defend the sporting and economic interests of the club, and under the arbitration of Dr. Muñoz Calero, a joint plea was addressed to His Excellency the National Sports Delegate, requesting an exception for said player, since the regulatory procedures had been previously completed.

Nevertheless, it was necessary for both clubs to come to an agreement and after my arduous effort in wanting to overcome all the difficulties, in a case that, more than difficult, seemed very special to me, feeling the regret of presuming that the decision would not be satisfied, I accepted the award and signed the pact, which established financial equality and an alternative contract between the two clubs, with the caveat that by mutual agreement the player could be permanently assigned by one club to the other.

Immediately after reporting to the club's Board of Directors, and knowing that the criteria of many members would have preferred it to be done in another way, my belief was confirmed that any of them, with more success, could better fulfill the mission That I presented my irrevocable resignation of my own free will, which has been accepted by the Royal Spanish Football Federation.

In the presidency of the Barcelona Football Club I have put all my possible capacity for work with enthusiasm, and if the Club has triumphed in sports it has been thanks to the collaboration of my colleagues on the Board of Directors, the technical services, the employees, coaches and, above all, the players, whom I have always encouraged and had true affection for.

Not having carried out everything I would have wanted for the benefit of the Club, I have no reason to feel satisfied; however, my five years on the Board are quite well known. For this reason, when I resign I do not feel bitterness.

I have sought the good for the satisfaction of doing it, and that is what my desires for the Barça colors of my beloved Barcelona Football Club have always tended to do”.

ANNEX 5

Barça renounces Di Stéfano

Madrid, October 23, 1953

“In Madrid, on October 23, 1953, on the one hand Mr. José Vidal-Ribas Güell, as a member of the Management Commission of the Barcelona Football Club, duly authorized by it and on behalf of and on behalf of the aforementioned Club, and on the other Mr. Santiago Bernabéu de Yeste, as president of the Real Madrid Football Club, and on behalf of the same, in relation to the agreement reached between the Presidents of both Clubs on September 15, under the arbitration of Mr. Armando Muñoz Calero, member of FIFA, agree and stipulate:

First. That the Barcelona Football Club expressly waives in favor of the Real Madrid Football Club all rights that correspond to it, in accordance with what is stipulated in section a) of the aforementioned agreement, regarding the player Mr. Alfredo Di Stéfano, the which, from this moment on, will depend on the exclusive discipline of Real Madrid Club de Fútbol during the four years of validity of the aforementioned agreement.

Second. That the Real Madrid Football Club, in compensation for this resignation, undertakes to repay the Barcelona Football Club the amount of FOUR MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESETAS, the amount of the disbursements made by the Barcelona Football Club, plus interest on the payment postponed in part that corresponds to satisfy the Real Madrid Club de Fútbol.

Third. The indicated amount of FOUR MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESETAS will be paid by Real Madrid Club de Fútbol in the following manner: ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESETAS, which are delivered in this act by bearer check number 329998 charged to current account number 20337 that Real Madrid Club de Fútbol has open at Banco Mercantil e Industrial, in Madrid. ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESETAS, in a letter accepted by the Real Madrid Football Club, maturing on July 31, 1954, being the effect used in this operation of the first class number A3351252. SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESETAS, in another bill accepted by the Real Madrid Football Club, maturing on January 31, 1955, being the first class bill used for this operation, number A3351253. NINE HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESETAS, in another letter accepted maturing on July 31, 1955, being the effect used in this first class operation number A3351254. This effect wipes out the total balance of the deferred account and the interest corresponding to it, and with this, all the obligations that the Real Madrid Football Club would have contracted with the Barcelona Football Club due to the assignment of the rights that this Club held over the player Mr. Di Stéfano.

And so that it is recorded and has all the effects, it is signed in quadruplicate by the parties in Madrid, on the date indicated above”.

And, more to more, as they say in my mother's land, I am attaching, as I announced before, the chapter of my 'Born to bother' about the signing of Kubala. Anyone who is patient and reads it will see that those events do not fit well with the image of a Barça persecuted during the Franco regime.

Barça takes Kubala

To explain today, more than fifty years later, what Kubala meant in Spanish soccer is difficult. He was the first imported genius, one could almost say 'the first genius', to dry, except for the presence, somewhat earlier, of Ben Barek, an exquisite Moroccan who arrived at Atlético well after thirty. But Kubala was a real 'boom'. Powerful and tremendously technical player, endowed with ball control and hitting unknown to date. Kubala stopped the ball that his own goalkeeper took long with his chest, foot or head, showed new dribbles, hit with effect or power, or with both at the same time, it was almost impossible for him to miss a penalty... That in times in which ours was still a somewhat rustic football and in which it was very difficult to see figures from other places. Here there was still no television and on the NO-Do news you only saw, when you did see, some plays from local matches. In addition to that, he was strong as a bull, beautiful to the point of insult, with light eyes, strong blond and wavy hair and powerful jaw. In that gray Spain it was a lightning bolt. He was ahead of the Di Stéfano and Puskas in time, with which he was alone for a few years. With him, Spanish football took a leap similar to that of the cinema when it went from black and white to 'technicolor'. Madrid discovered that player, Madrid wanted him, Madrid contacted him... and he signed for Barça, with the base of the contract that Madrid itself had prepared for him. Kubala, now deceased (his funeral, in May 2002, was a massive act in Barcelona) was born in Budapest on June 10, 1927, the son of a Hungarian and a Czechoslovakian mother. Very soon he was a famous player in both countries. He played for Slovan in Bratislava and for Vasas in Budapest and was international with both countries, for having both nationalities. (Later, nationalized Spanish, he would also be with us, thus becoming the only footballer in history who has achieved international status in three different countries). But to Kubala, the 'amateur' framework of football decreed in the countries of the Eastern Europe after World War II was too tight for him. There, professionalism in sports was considered a vice of capitalism, and although good athletes had 'a pass' because they were usually granted positions in the State that provided them comfortable salaries in exchange for doing nothing more than their sport, he was not convinced by the solution. He wanted to be a real professional and, still at twenty-one, he came into contact with one of the organizations that were dedicated to getting people out of the "communist paradise" into the capitalist world. On January 27, 1948, he was transported in a truck, dressed as a Russian soldier, to very close to the Austrian border. Years later he told me about the fear that happened when they passed a control, for the possibility of being recognized. But it happened. They left him near the border and, together with the other fugitives, he completed his escape by walking all night. In Innsbruck he met the president of the Italian club Pro Patria, from Busto Arsizio, for whom he signed. Pro Patria had a vague promise from FIFA that after a year the player, despite having escaped with a current contract for Vasas, could already play with all the law in Italy. Vasas, meanwhile, had denounced the player's flight to the Hungarian Federation, and the latter transferred the case to FIFA, which on March 18 announced the footballer's suspension for one year. And with Pro Patria he began to play some friendlies, since he could not participate in the official championship while his case was not resolved. But FIFA soon let Pro Patria know that the more it used the player in exhibitions, the more difficult it would be to resolve the vexing matter of his escape and get a transfer from the Hungarian Federation. In fact, after one year, on March 18, 1950, FIFA reported that Kubala was still disqualified. So Pro Patria dismissed him and he traveled to Rome, where he met a group of players in the same situation: men who had jumped 'The Iron Curtain' to gain a foothold in the rich professional football of Italy, France, Spain or anywhere else. All together they formed a team that they called 'Hungaria', in attention to the fact that all of its components were Hungarian except four. The coach was Fernando Daucik, whose sister Kubala was married to. In principle, they made a good living by signing up for exhibition matches all over Italy, until the then very strong Italian Communist Party put so much pressure on them that they stopped being hired. And then they started looking abroad. Spain, a territory where they were not going to find problems, given the bitter anti-communism of the time in our country, as Duncan Shaw rightly points out in his 'Football and Francoism',which dedicates a chapter to the arrival of soccer players in Spain during the period. And in May 1950 a letter was received at the Madrid offices with the offer of a friendly match for Hungary. Bernabéu, who had heard about the quality of the team, finds it a good idea and accepts the match. On June 5, Hungaria jumped onto the Chamartín field, with Kubala in their ranks. In Madrid he plays goalkeeper Acuña, from Deportivo de La Coruña, at the request of the coach, who is thinking about this position with a view to the imminent World Cup in Brazil. (Also, at the request of the coach, Miguel Muñoz plays inside right, instead of right midfield, his usual position). Madrid wins 4-2, but both goals for Hungaria are scored by Kubala, which amazes everyone. Madrid immediately talks to Kubala and proposes the signing. But there is a catch: Kubala wants his brother-in-law-coach, Fernando Daucik, to be hired along with him, something that Bernabéu is not willing to do. By then he has an English coach, Mister Keeping, in whom he is willing to continue trusting. Between that and a query to the Federation, which sees problems in the matter, decides to think about it. Hungaria, meanwhile, completes a tour that has been backstitching in Spain to the beat of their first visit to Madrid: June 8 at the Metroplitano, against the Spanish selection; on the 10th, in Sarriá against the Spanish; on the 14th, again against Spain at the Metropolitan (we are on the eve of the World Cup, hence so much activity from the National Team, which would later come out fourth in Brazil) and on the 18th, again in Sarriá with the Spanish. In all the games there are many goals and in all of them Kubala stands out. But, between the penultimate and the last, on June 16, the sensational news was produced: Kubala has signed for Barça… as a fan player! Sparks fly at Madrid. Hernández Coronado, general secretary of the club, raises a protest to the Federation denouncing that Barcelona had breached a famous 'non-aggression pact' between the two clubs, by meddling in an operation that was underway. Barça rejects the accusation, declaring, through the voice of Narciso de Carreras (at the time a manager, with Montal senior, later to be president), that they had been in contact for months, which was most likely not true. At the same time, Barça argues that because Kubala is an 'amateur' player, since professionalism was not recognized in Hungary, he enjoyed, according to current regulations in Spain for 'amateur' players, full freedom to sign for any team. In any case, the contract as an amateur did not allow Kubala to earn the money for which he left his country, and as long as the Hungarian Federation did not agree to send the transfer he could not play official matches. In reality, it was no more than a pre-contract for when the pass could be formally arranged with all of the law. Hungaria spent the summer in Mallorca and was in the dissolution phase. In fact, it would dissolve on July 26. And Kubala takes a new step to unblock the situation. With his brother-in-law already 'placed' at Barça and thinking, perhaps, that Madrid would have more strength than the Catalan club to get him out of the situation, or simply with the intention of urging him to move, he sends a letter to Madrid asking him to start new negotiations. Barça, who knows this, decides to sign him, on July 27 (just one day after the formal dissolution of Hungaria) a contract in which he was included on the payroll as an 'amateur' with a monthly salary of 1,200 pesetas plus a complement of 3,800 as 'stimulus and food'. Barça forced many legal mechanisms when making this contract, but had the support of the secretary of the Spanish Federation, Ricardo Cabot, a pro Barcelona player who had worked for the club for many years. And with the interest of the Regime, which saw in Kubala the possibility of a coup against international communism, which was one of its great ghosts. And on October 12 Kubala finally debuted with Barça, in Les Corts, in a friendly against Osasuna. Madrid once again protested to the Federation, which replied with this letter: "It is with great pleasure that we reply to your thoughtful letter, dated today, regarding the situation of the Hungarian player Kubala, and we inform you that both said gentleman and his teammates of the Hungaria C. de F., cannot act in any Club statutorily affiliated to a national Federation registered in the F.I.F.A., unless the interested parties present the transfer certificate of their Federation of origin, which, with regard specifically to these players, will not give it, for having left the Club that owned the regulatory rights over them... their participation in friendly matches will not be possible either,Well, to take part in them, you must be registered with the Club that tries to align you, and this Royal Spanish Football Federation, in compliance with the warning that has been made, will not dispatch any request that is made to it in this regard... ” With the situation still only half resolved, Kubala trains with Barça, serves as a model for his brother-in-law to improve the technique of other players and for tests on the field, but he cannot play. They tempt him from the Colombian pirate league (where some of his former teammates from Hungaria play and where Di Stéfano is then still unknown in Spain). Atlético Bucaramanga came into contact with him, but the operation did not materialize. In December he plays two new Christmas friendlies, with as many ridiculous fines of 50 pesetas for Barça. And meanwhile, the authorities of the Regime, who have seen in it the great opportunity, move. On April 2, 1951, he was given the status of political refugee, as a stateless person. And shortly he was granted Spanish nationality, after being baptized in the Catholic faith in Águilas (Murcia), the birthplace of the President of the Spanish Federation, Armando Muñoz Calero. (The one with the famous 'Your Excellency, we have defeated the Perfidious Albión'). And already in the Cup championship he can make his debut in an official match, as a Spaniard, against Sevilla, not yet a year after his appearance in Chamartín. Later on, Barça will pay for the player's file to his two clubs of origin. In September 1952, he paid 12 million lire to Pro Patria, which was claiming some rights. And, already in August 1954, the FIFA Congress held in Berne, during the World Cup in Switzerland, finally obtained the consent of Hungary to send the player's transfer in exchange for a payment of the equivalent of 300,000 pesetas. In reality, only from that moment it can be said that Kubala's situation is perfectly normalized. By then he had already played for Barça for two years, for which he had successively won Cup, League, Cup, League and Cup. Everything. It is Barça's period of 'The Five Cups', which is sometimes associated with that series of five consecutive championships, but which was actually born at the end of 51-52, in which Barça won everything: League, Cup, Latin Cup (disputed by the champions of Spain, Italy, France and Portugal) plus the "Duward Cup" and the "Martini Rossi Trophy" advertising trophies but valued at the time, which rewarded the team with the most goals and the fewest goals. Yes, with Kubala, Barça took a leap, to the point that Les Corts became too small and his presence forced Barça to take the step that Bernabéu had already taken in 1947: the construction of a new, more capable stadium, the Camp Nou. The stories of Barça written from that date, very inclined to recount more or less real or imaginary tasks suffered by the club under Francoism, usually tiptoe over the signing of Kubala, to whose achievement the Regime contributed so much. In these stories he appears as if by magic, as the Announcing Angel appeared in the room of the Virgin Mary. But to achieve this, Barça had the determined cooperation of various official bodies, who saw the opportunity to make Kubala an anti-communist symbol, and as such he was profusely presented in the press of the time. Not only that, but with him as the protagonist. a film 'Los Ases buscan la Paz' was shot, a direct piece of anti-communist propaganda, loaded with all the tics of the time. The film justifies Kubala's desire to leave Hungary because they force him to spy when he traveled outside his country with the national team or with his team. The scene to describe this is particularly naive. Kubala is dressed to go out onto the field in Rome when a guy dressed in a raincoat, very much like a communist secret policeman, calls him up and tells him that he has to spy. Kubala says that he refuses, that he is only an athlete and the other tells him to face the consequences. One, watching the film now, wonders how a footballer can spy on him when he goes out with his team to play a game, and wonders if the people of that time could believe such things, or if the propaganda was blind enough to not even think about it. For the rest, the film narrates the adventures of his departure and his difficulties until he finds happiness in an ideal country, Spain, and in a city that is also Barcelona, ​​as a successful footballer. A good man who fights to escape the clutches of communism and to earn a decent living with the only thing he knows how to do: play soccer. Several sections of the film are shot at the Barça facilities, and some other club players collaborate in it, such as Ramallets and Biosca, considered the most photogenic of the group. To complete the chapter I will give voice to Sancho Dávila in the following paragraph,that he was president of the Federation from February 1952 until the spring of 1954, when he fell as a result of the elimination of Spain by Turkey in the qualification for the World Cup in Switzerland that was to be played that summer. The elimination occurred in a tiebreaker in Rome, which in turn ended in a tie and was resolved by draw. Minutes before the game, with the players already dressed, a telegram was received from FIFA warning about the presence of Kubala in the team. Kubala had already played some games with Spain, but the issue of his escape from Hungary was still not well enough resolved in the international paperwork and the Federation decided, prudently, to leave him out of the game and replace him with Escudero. (Then we ran out of the World Cup, because of the piece of paper with the name of Turkey extracted from a glass by a happy bambino named Franco Gemma and that was the crying and gnashing of teeth). But I return to Sancho Dávila. When he resigned after the elimination, he wrote a book with his memories of those two years and little, entitled 'De Vuelta a Casa'. And, nailed as the 'Kubala case' was, he made an effort to count all the steps that had been taken during his command to fully legalize the player's position. What follows is one of the chapters. The first line refers to the meeting that was called, during the 1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki, with the Hungarian legation. Then he makes an account of other meetings. The text is this: 'With our interview with the Hungarians I will end this chapter. But first I have to dedicate a space to the much debated issue, which can be summed up in a single word: Kubala. Of Czech origin, registered by the Hungarian Federation as an 'amateur' player and in the Vasas club in Budapest, the player Laszlo Kubala He fled from Hungary and crossed the border that separated this country from the Austrian zone of German occupation (errata, it means American), in the month of January 1949. He did not carry a passport. He had to evade police surveillance, according to a statement by the Hungarian Federation in a letter he addressed to FIFA dated February 2 of that year. Once in the free world, he wanted to integrate the Italian club Pro Patria into his team. To this end, on March 19 he submitted a letter to the FIFA secretary, accompanied by another to the Hungarian Federation, asserting his status as an 'amateur'. Protected by article 31 of the Regulations, committing himself to that club in exchange for a certain amount as expenses, during the year that he had to remain without playing, his registration by the Italian Federation was not formalized and, naturally, the commitment was without effect. .In June 1950 the term expired. Kubala then spoke with a Spanish club. And because they did not have the FIFA transfer certificate, the Royal Spanish Federation had to deny the authorization. In the meetings in Brussels and Zurich, Mr. Muñoz Calero presented the case. Mr. Drewry was commissioned to make a thorough study of the matter. He was sent a dossier with all the background. And the ruling was favorable to the Spanish request. It was clearly indicated that the Hungarian claim had more of a political nature than of a sporting nature. When it was sent from Zurich to London, the dossier inexplicably "got lost". Unfortunately, not even a copy had been made. The originals had not been kept either. Nor were photocopies made. Clearly the maneuver had to be made a new dossier, based on the statements of the Hungarians, without possible comparison. In short, "curtain" style, it was about condemning Kubala and surrendering him for the hunger pact. The Spanish Executive Committee, with prior authorization from the National Sports Delegation, met and agreed that the C.F. Barcelona will field the player in competition matches. With more reason, such as having been nationalized Spanish, according to the agreement of the Council of Ministers on June 1, inserted in the Official State Gazette of the 27th of the same month of the year 1951. On the other hand, in Brussels, the Emergency Committee again he wanted to put article 118 into force. To inform and defend his rights, a Spanish representation attended this meeting, chaired by Manuel Valdés, then president; the member of the Executive Committee Mr. Agustín Pujol and the representative of Spain in FIFA, Mr. Muñoz Calero. With solid arguments, our Delegation made it clear that when the aforementioned article 118 was approved in the Statutes, the chaotic state of the world could not be foreseen as an epilogue to the last world war, nor that said provision could be used by a sports federation as a means of action and political persecution. They clearly made it clear that Kubala fled his country not to commodify his activities as a soccer player to the highest bidder for his own benefit,but with the sole purpose of fleeing a certain death for not lending itself to be a blind instrument of communism. Because he had been forced to attend a communist seminar. He resisted. And "out of lukewarmness" his murder had been decided. This was corroborated by Mathias Toth, former president of Vasas, President of the Commission that disqualified the Hungarian player. He also escaped from Hungary later. The accusations of the Hungarian Federation could not have any value either, since such denunciations were dated January 31, 1949 and Kubala played his last game in Budapest on the 25th of that month. In order not to overwhelm the Finally, reader, I will point out that another meeting was held in London in October 1951. In it, the Spanish Delegation was promised that "the case was resolved." Both the Spanish and foreign press, with great headlines, announced it as such. On the 28th, in the best mood, we confronted the Hungarian Federation. As we had planned, Mr. Rimet presided over us. The present President, Mr. Seeldrayers, and the Secretary, Mr. Gassmann, also attended. The meeting was held in a small room of the Hotel Vaccuna. In my many pilgrimages, since my childhood, through all the countries of Europe, except Russia, as the passports indicate, I have never seen any hotel of such original construction. Its modern style, with elegant and artistic lines, contrasts with the solid mass of one of the largest stations in the world, the one in Helsinki, located opposite. The Hungarian representative and three other members took their seats with us. We had exchanged a cool greeting, a nod. They immediately started attacking Kubala: “He is a deserter from our country.” We told them to stick to the sporting aspect. We remind you of an old saying: "From what is lost, take what you can". The interview lasted about three quarters of an hour. Our fundamental requests were: economic compensation in his favor and the signing of a commitment on his part in which they would definitively renounce any subsequent claim against the player. -Kubala -we said- has the right to live from soccer. "I've also been a player," said one of the members. When the Germans invaded my country, I fled to France and I was able to live thanks to the classes I gave. Mr. Muñoz Calero asked Mr. Rimet: -Isn't it true that FIFA recognizes professionalism? Why, then, can't you make a living from this sport? Our reasoning was very convincing; their denunciations were devoid of all sense and we undid all their arguments. And there was agreement. Spain, that is, C.F.Barcelona, ​​would deliver a certain amount to Vasas. Addressing Mr. Gassmann and Andrés Ramírez, I begged them to write the commitment, which would be signed at that moment. -Without consulting? -they asked me. -And paying the amount stipulated on the spot, in FIFA, from our account - I answered. They exchanged glances. They spoke in their language among themselves, although up to that moment we all spoke in French. They rose. And with a grim face they told us that they could not resolve without first consulting Budapest. Again, as in 1951, the "Kubala" case remained in the air, hindering all the good will of the Spanish Federation and its representative in FIFA. When the Spanish Delegation said goodbye to Mr. Rimet, the respectable and affectionate old man held my hands in his and told me: -You see, dear, what life is. It is said that you support an atrocious dictatorship and, without consulting, you can resolve. On the other hand, those of the "new world" by themselves do not dare to take even a step. Until Rome, reader, I leave this matter. The 'until Rome' refers to a later chapter of the book itself, in which he deals with take away blame for what happened in that elimination against Turkey. But what happened in Rome confirms that even then the Federation did not have Kubala's transfer, and that is why, given FIFA's warning, they refused to line up for him in such a crucial match. The final arrangement did not arrive until August of that 1954, just after the World Cup in Switzerland. In short, Barça took Kubala because he handled himself better. The secretary of the Spanish Federation was Ricardo Cabot, a Barcelona fan, and possibly that helped him. But then he knew how to move all the springs of the Regime, which happily worked on the construction of that anti-communist symbol. The hiring of Kubala was a whole 'joint venture' between Barça and the Regime and it is convenient not to forget it when making a judgment with a perspective of the comparative history between Madrid and Barça. The National Sports Delegate during the events was General Moscardó, the presidents of the Federation were all men very much of the Regime, as it could not be less. Sancho Dávila was an early Falangist, José Antonio's comrade of arrows and stars,whom he calls 'The Boss' in the introduction of the aforementioned 'De Vuelta a Casa'. In fact, that was his greatest merit in reaching the presidency of the Federation (replacing Valdés Larrañaga, another Francoist notorious man who left office for the embassy in Santo Domingo), because in reality he was a man 'of the bull', completely oblivious until his appointment to football. By the way, as seen in the collected chapter, it also includes the thesis that Kubala left Hungary not to earn money, but fleeing certain death. A little the thesis of the film, it is understood that the official thesis in the Regime.